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Case No. 20090148-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.
JULLYN DOYLE,

Defendant/ Appellant.
Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for illegal possession or use of a
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 5837-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2007), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37(a)-5(l) (West 2004). This
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue I. Whether the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion to
arrest judgment, rejecting her claims of prosecutorial misconduct for: (1) failing
to correct allegedly false testimony concerning a plea agreement with a codefendant; and (2) failing to disclose the same information prior to trial, in
violation of rule 16(g), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Standard of Review. This Court reviews the denial of such a motion for an
abuse of discretion. See State v. Buck, 2009 UT App 2, 110, 200 R3d 674, cert,
denied 2007 P.3d 432 (Utah 2009); State v. Wengreen, 2007 UT App 264, ^ 10,167
P.3d 516, cert, denied, 186 P.3d 957 (Utah 2008).
Issue II. Whether the trial court properly admitted pursuant to rule
404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, evidence of Defendant's 2006 DUI conviction,
2007 DUI arrest, and statements and toxicology reports establishing Defendant's
use of methamphetamine in both matters.
Standard of Review. This Court reviews a trial court's decision to admit
evidence under rule 404(b) for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Kooyman, 2005
UT App 222, 115,112 P.3d 1252, cert, denied, 25 P.3d 102 (Utah 2005); State v.
Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, % 12,57 P.3d 1139; see also State v. Widdison, 2001 UT
60, f 42,28 P.3d 1278.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following rules are determinative of the issues herein.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 404:
Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions;
other crimes.

(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order
to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
2

admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the
accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable
notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial
notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it
intends to introduce at trial.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charges. Defendant was charged by amended information with one
count of illegal possession or use of a controlled substance, a third degree
felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. R. 287-88.
Relevant Rule 404(b) Motions. Defendant moved preemptively to
prevent the use at trial of prior bad act evidence under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of
Evidence. R. 101-02. The State then filed a notice of intent to introduce at trial
the following evidence under rule 404(b):
• Defendant's 2006 DUI conviction for driving while under the influence of
methamphetamine;
• Defendant's admission during the 2006 DUI arrest that she had consumed
meth;
• A toxicology report from the 2006 DUI arrest showing meth in
Defendant's system; and
•

A toxicology report from an August 2007 DUI arrest showing meth in
Defendant's system.

R. 105-10,241-42; R. 474:2-5; R. 478:17. The court heard argument, then denied
Defendant's motion, finding all the evidence admissible under rule 404(b). R.
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239-42 (Order on Defendant's Motion to Exclude Prior Bad Acts Evidence,
attached in Addendum A). Defendant filed a petition seeking interlocutory
review of the order, which this Court denied. R. 247,254.
Defendant thereafter moved again to exclude evidence from the 2007 DUI
arrest, which motion the court denied on the morning of the first day of trial. R.
295-97, 311-12; R. 472: 3-4, 20-28.
Discovery. Defendant filed several discovery requests prior to trial. R.
14-16, 20-21, 45-46, 47-48. Specifically, she requested "[a] copy of any and all
written or verbal offers to any co-defendant in this case in exchange for
testimony against the Defendant7' and "[a] copy of any agreements made by any
of the co-defendants to testify against Defendant in this case/7 R. 46. The State
filed an initial response to this request on December 20, 2007, stating "To date,
no offers have been made to any codefendants in exchange for testifying against
this defendant.77 R. 193.
In May 2008, the State entered into a plea bargain with Shantel Cuenca, a
co-defendant in this case. R. 473:341-47. Cuenca had been charged with
possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, a first-degree felony.
R. 473:341-43. The State agree to amend the count to a second degree felony of
possession of meth in a drug-free zone and to dismiss the remaining counts in
that case in exchange for Cuenca7 s agreement to testify against Defendant. R.

4

473:341-44. In a second case, Cuenca was charged with three charges, the most
serious of which was distribution of meth in a drlig-free zone with prior
convictions, a first-degree felony that required a mandatory prison sentence. R.
473:345-47. Cuenca again agreed to testify against Defendant in exchange for a
plea of guilty to a charge of giving false information to a police officer, which
allowed her to request probation at sentencing and obtain dismissal of the
remaining charges. Id.
The State thereafter filed a supplemental response to Defendant's
discovery request, mistakenly stating that the request for information
concerning plea agreements involved information that was "not discoverable/'
R. 283, 464. Defendant did not seek an order compelling release of the
information or otherwise objecting to the State's position. R. 464.
Trial. On the first day of trial, the prosecutor called Cuenca, who testified
that she watched Defendant smoking meth from a pipe being passed around by
the people in the bedroom.1 R. 472:148-49,164-65. Thereafter, the prosecutor
established that Cuenca had been convicted of possession with intent to
distribute, both in this case and in another case. R. 472:457-58. The following
exchange then occurred:

1

Cuenca had not previously mentioned that Defendant was smoking meth
while in the bedroom that night. R. 472:168-69.
-5

[Pros.]

Okay. Were you ever given a deal on your charges for
— in exchange for your testimony today?

[Cuenca]

No.

Q.

Has anyone ever asked you to testify in a specific way?

A.

No, I always told everybody I wouldn't lie.

R. 472:158. On cross-examination, defense counsel pursued the matter further:
[Def. CnsL] From this incident, you pled guilty, correct?
[Cuenca]

I did.

Q.

And it's your testimony that the State didn't offer you a deal
to testify against Ms. Doyle?

A.

Nope.

Q.

You've been convicted since then?

A.

I have.

Q.

How many times -

A.

Once.

Q.

- for felonies? How many?
. . . [Tjhere's been three.

Q.

All right, and on — did you take deals on those, or did you
take those to a trial like we're doing today?

A.

Nope, I'm on a five to life.
6

Q.

So you actually took a deal, you plM guilty?

A.

Yeah, pled guilty to them.

Q.

All right, and the State didn't offer you a deal at that time?

A.

Nope.

Q.

Okay. So you're doing this just -4 why are you testifying
today?

A.

Everyone's asking me to.

R. 472:168-69.
The following day, after the State had rested, defense counsel moved to
dismiss the case, arguing that there was, in fact, a ple$ agreement between the
State and Cuenca and that the prosecutor: (1) violated rule 16, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure by failing to inform Defendant prior to trial of the plea
agreement; and (2) suborned perjury by failing to correct Cuenca's trial
testimony concerning the plea agreement. R. 319-21; R. 473:304-22. After
hearing argument and reviewing the written plea agreements, the trial judge
denied the motion, finding: (1) there was no misconduct by the prosecutor; (2)
the question of whether Cuenca had committed perjury was for the jury; and (3)
Defendant could have discovered the plea arrangement herself. R. 473:320-22
(attached in Addendum B). The judge expressly informed defense counsel that

7

he was free to impeach Cuenca with the plea agreements when the trial
resumed. Id.
Defendant thereafter called Cuenca's attorney, Gunda Jarvis, as a witness.
R. 473:336-59. Ms. Jarvis testified in detail concerning the plea negotiations and
the terms of the agreements reached between the State and her client. Id. She
explained that if Cuenca "were to testify that she didn't receive any deal in
exchange for her testimony against [Defendant], that would be false[.]" R.
473:348. With the prosecutor's stipulation, defense counsel submitted as
evidence the two written plea statements. R. 473:340-47, 357.
Conviction. Following a two-day jury trial, Defendant was convicted as
charged. R. 324-26, 351-52; R. 473: 414. Defendant then filed a motion to arrest
judgment, making the same arguments concerning prosecutorial misconduct as
she had presented in his earlier motion to dismiss. R. 374-95,465-66. The trial
court denied the motion.

R. 478: 7, R. 445-48, 461-66 (Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law & Order, attached in Addendum C).
Sentencing, The trial court imposed and suspended an indeterminate
prison term of zero to five years for the possession or use of a controlled
substance conviction and imposed and suspended a jail term of 180 days for the
possession of drug paraphernalia conviction. R. 445-48. The court placed
Defendant on probation for 36 months and ordered her to serve 90 days in jail,

&

running the sentence consecutive with any other sentences Defendant was
serving. Id.
Notice of Appeal. Defendant timely appealed. R. 458-60.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Present Case, The Utah County Major Crimes Task Force executed a
no-knock warrant on the home of Shantel Cuenca on June 28,2007. R. 472:146,
176-80. After deploying two distraction devices, a SWAT team entered the
trailer and secured the premises. R. 472:126,133,136,1$3. Of the approximately
fourteen people in the trailer, one child was found alone in the living room, and
Defendant, Cuenca, and two others were found in the back bedroom. R.
472:134-35,143,147-49,159-60,187.
Cuenca had called Defendant earlier that night tp come by the trailer and
pick up Cuenca's daughter. R. 472:150,164,169. When Defendant arrived, she
joined Cuenca, a girl named Nikki, and Jorge Lopez-Navarette in the bedroom.
R. 472:147-48, 150, 169-70.

Cuenca sold approximately 1.7 grams of

methamphetamine to Nikki. R. 472:147,161-63. All four then smoked some
meth using a pipe. R. 472:147-48,151,155,166.
As the SWAT team entered the trailer, Cuencfa attempted to hide the
contraband that was in her bedroom. R. 472:151-52,1|51. Officers entering that
room were met by a wall of haze and smoke, and a chemical odor of freshly

9

burnt methamphetamine. R. 472:195-96. Their initial search of the room turned
up meth in a Doritos bag, meth under Cuenca's mattress, meth in Cuenca's
purse, and meth on Cuenca's nightstand. R. 472:152, 154,197. Officers also
found two pipes and a plastic baggie containing meth. R. 472:188,198. The
baggie was found on the floor between Defendant and Jorge and "within inches
of [Defendant's] foot." R. 472:188,190; R. 473:246, 267. The Doritos bag was
within Defendant's reach. R. 473:267. Cuenca claimed ownership of all of the
drugs found in the trailer, except the baggie found near Defendant's feet. R. 473:
246. A more thorough search of the bedroom revealed cash, a bong, and more
meth. R. 473:262-63. Overall, officers found sixty grams of meth. R. 473:265.
Officer John Barson attempted to interview Defendant later that night at
Cuenca's home. R. 472:202-03. Defendant was "extremely confrontational,"
"verbally aggressive," "extremely physically agitated[,]" "very angry[,]" and
generally "exhibited many of the symptoms . . . associated with
methamphetamine use." R. 472:203-04; R. 473:240. The officer ultimately
stopped the interview because Defendant was so hostile. R. 472:205. About 30
minutes later, Defendant asked to speak to Officer Barson. R. 472: 205-06. She
admitted that she knew there was meth in the bedroom and that they were
preparing to smoke it. R. 472:206.

10

Prior Bad Acts. Officer Dennis Chapman arrested Defendant for DUI in
2006. R. 473:270-71. The officer observed that she was nervous, twitching,
shaking, and unable to sit still, causing him to suspect she had been using drugs.
R. 473:272-73. When asked, Defendant admitted that she had recently taken
meth, and that "she smoked meth whenever she got a chance." R. 473:273,27576. A blood test confirmed that she had meth in her system. R. 473:273-74.
In August 2007, Defendant was again arrested for DUI. R. 109. A blood
test showed meth in her system. R. 473:290-92.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Point I. This Court need not decide whether, as Defendant claims, the
prosecutor knowingly used false testimony or failed to timely disclose the
existence of the plea arrangement with Cuenca pursuant to rule 16, Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure, because Defendant is not entitled to relief where she fails
to establish the requisite prejudice. Counsel failed to follow up on the matter
prior to trial when the prosecutor alerted him to the possible existence of a plea
arrangement, he in fact discovered a plea arrangement immediately prior to
trial, he called Cuenca's counsel as a witness to establish the existence and
particulars of the arrangement, he admitted copies of the plea statements for the
jury to review, and he vigorously argued in closing that the situation rendered
Cuenca incredible.

11

Point II.

Defendant's claim that the prior bad act evidence was

inadmissible under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, is without
merit. The lower court properly recognized and applied the relevant three-step
analysis, finding that the evidence relating to Defendant's 2006 and 2007 DUI
arrests and her use of meth was offered for the proper noncharacter purpose of
helping to establish that Defendant had the power and the intent to possess or
use the meth and paraphernalia at issue. It established not only that she chose
to use meth, but that she used it before and shortly after the charged incident,
suggesting deliberate and habitual use.

Hence, the evidence was relevant.

Moreover, the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed
by any danger of unfair prejudice where the evidence was exceedingly strong,
was necessary to the State's constructive possession case, and was not the sort to
rouse the jury to overmastering hostility toward Defendant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
NO RELIEF IS WARRANTED WHERE THE RECORD CLEARLY
DEMONSTRATES THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT
PREJUDICED BY THE ALLEGEDLY FALSE TESTIMONY
Defendant contends that the trial court should have granted her motion to
arrest judgment because prosecutorial misconduct denied her a fair trial. See Br.
of Aplt. at 13,15. She argues that the prosecutor not only offered, but "relied on

12

. . . and failed to correct" false testimony from Shantel Cuenca concerning the
existence of a plea agreement. Id. at 15-19. She summarily claims that there is "a
reasonable likelihood that the judgment of the jury c0uld be affected" by the
false testimony and that the prosecutor's misconduct, combined with his failure
to inform Defendant of the existence of the plea agreement prior to trial,
"substantially impaired" her right to a fair trial and warrants reversal of her
convictions. Id. at 15-25.
The trial court declined to arrest judgment, finding that
-Defendant was put on notice of a possible plea deal but failed to address
the matter before trial;
-any error in the State's failure to provide the plea information prior to
trial was cured by defendant's thorough exploration into the plea deal in
the course of the trial; and
-the State did not suborn perjury where Cuenca "may have believed she
did not receive a plea deal" because she pled| guilty to a first degree
felony and was actually sentenced to prison for it.2
Add. Cat 3-5.

2

The court explained that Cuenca had been charged with a first degree
felony in one case and had ultimately pled guilty to a first degree felony in
another. R. 463. The plea agreement resulted in disn^issal of a drug-free zone
enhancement, which removed the penalty of a mandatory five years to life and
allowed Cuenca to request probation at sentencing. See Add. A at 4-5.
However, the judge sentenced her to five years to life in prison for the first
degree felony. Id. Hence, the court noted, Cuenca njay not have believed she
received a deal under the agreement. Id.
13

This Court need not decide whether the prosecutor knowingly used false
testimony or failed to timely disclose the existence of the plea agreement
because, even assuming as much, the trial court correctly found no prejudice
where Defendant not only knew of the relevant information, but "thoroughly
explored" it during trial. Add. C at 3-4.
"It is undisputed that a criminal conviction procured by the knowing use
of false testimony is fundamentally unfair" and violative of the due process
clauses of the federal and state constitutions. State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 24
(Utah 1984); Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 690 (Utah 1981); State v. Gordon, 886
P.2d 112,115-16 (Utah App. 1994). However, relief is not warranted unless
there is a "'reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the
judgment of the jury/" Gordon, 886 P.2d at 116 (quoting Walker, 624 P.2d at 690);
see also Hewitt, 689 P.2d at 24.
Similarly, "a breach of discovery rules does not warrant reversal absent a
showing of prejudice to the defendant." State v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 807 (Utah
1993) (citation omitted); see also State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262,274-75 (Utah 1998)
("Unless a review of the record shows that the court's decision is plainly wrong
in that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial, we will not find that
. .. the court's decision was an abuse of discretion.") (quotations and citations
omitted). Moreover, unless or until "defendant can make a credible argument

14

that the prosecutor's errors have impaired the defense," the burden never shifts
to the State to show "that there is no reasonable likelihood that absent the error,
the outcome of trial would have been more favorable fdr the defendant." State v.
Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 921 (Utah 1987). A "mere possibility" of a different
outcome is not sufficient: rather, "the likelihood of a different outcome must be
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict." Id. at 920.
In this case, Defendant is unable to make the requisite showing of
prejudice to warrant relief either for prosecutorial misconduct or for a discovery
violation. She argues that she was prejudiced by the prosecutor's conduct
because Cuenca's "false statements could have affected the judgment of the
jury" given "the nature of [her] testimony [.]" Br. of A^lt. at 24-25. Her claim is
wholly without merit, however, because the record demonstrates that Cuenca's
plea-related statements were fully explained, evaluated, and argued by the
parties during the trial, alleviating any possible prejudice that may have
otherwise arisen from the testimony.
Defense counsel became concerned about Cuenca's testimony when he
discovered just prior to trial that she would testify foit the State. R. 473:310-11,
318. He immediately investigated her criminal history and located one of her
plea agreements. R. 473:310-11,318-19. Cuenca testified on direct examination
that she had not been given a deal in exchange for her testimony. R. 472:158; R.
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473:309-10.

On cross-examination, defense counsel repeatedly asked her

whether she had received a plea deal, but her testimony did not change. R.
472:166; R. 473:311, 319.
The following day, defense counsel put the attorney who negotiated
Cuenca's plea deal, Gunda Jarvis, on the stand to testify extensively regarding
the facts and conditions surrounding the plea deal. R. 473:321,336-59. Defense
counsel introduced into evidence, with the State's stipulation, both written plea
statements from Cuenca's criminal cases. R. 473:357. Both sides thereafter
argued the evidence in closing, with the prosecutor acknowledging the plea
agreements and explaining how Cuenca may have believed that she did not get
a deal, while defense counsel took the opportunity to use the evidence to
impeach Cuenca.3 R. 473:388-89,407-09.
Consequently, the jury had before it all the relevant information
concerning Cuenca's testimony, including the written plea agreements, prior to
deliberations. While the prosecutor could have acted more quickly to clarify
Cuenca's initial testimony, both parties together effectively removed any
possible misunderstanding about the value of any plea deal. The jurors could
have had no doubt about the existence of the plea agreements, and they were

3

The prosecutor never argued to the jury that there were no plea
agreements in place.
16

fully able to use the details of those agreements to determine the weight and
credibility of Cuenca's testimony. See Hewitt, 689 P.2d at 25; Gordon, 886 P.2d at
116 n.9. In the end, they convicted Defendant as charged. Hence, she was not
entitled to an arrest of judgment, and the lower court dici not abuse its discretion
in denying her motion. See Gordon, 886 P.2d at 116-17 (where the false testimony
was effectively corrected by the parties at trial, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in so holding); see also Hewitt, 689 P.2d at 25 (where the defendants7
counsel recognized the problem with the testimony aftd conducted extensive
cross-examination about it, "[defendants were not in any way prejudiced[,]"
and it was properly left to the jury to determine the weight and credibility of the
testimony).
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE
CHALLENGED EVIDENCE WAS RELEVANT TO A
MATERIAL ISSUE AND THAT ITS PROBATIVE VALUE WAS
NOT SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED BY THE POTENTIAL
FOR UNFAIR PREJUDICE
Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its jiiscretion by ruling that
the State could use the following evidence at trial:
1. A 2006 DUI conviction in which Defendant was found to have
been driving under the influence of methamphetamine;
2. Defendant's admissions during the 2006 DUI arrest that she had
consumed methamphetamine;
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3. The toxicology report from the 2006 DUI arrest that showed
methamphetamine in Defendant's system; and
4. The toxicology report from an August 2007 DUI arrest that
again showed methamphetamine in Defendant's blood.
See Br. of Aplt. at 25-30; Add. A at 2-3.

She claims that the evidence was

admitted solely to establish her propensity to commit meth-related offenses, and
that, in any event, any probative value in the prior bad acts evidence was
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Br. of Aplt. at
28-30. The trial court properly admitted the evidence.
A. Rule 404(b) Analysis
A trial court's admission of evidence under rule 404(b) is reviewed for
abuse of discretion. See State v. Kooyman, 2005 UT App 222,115,112 P.3d 1252,
cert, denied, 125 P.3d 102 (Utah 2005); State v. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, \ 12,57
P.3d 1139. So long as evidence is offered for "a proper, non-character purpose"
it is presumptively admissible. Bradley, 2002 UT App 348, ^f 18-19 (citing State v.
Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, f 18, 6 P.3d 1120, cert, denied, 221 P.3d 837 (2009).
The admissibility of prior bad acts under rule 404(b) turns on a three-step
analysis. See Order at 2; see also State v. MarcM, 2009 UT App 262, f 29,219 P.3d
75; see also Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, ^ 18-20. First, the evidence must be
"offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, such as one of those specifically
listed in rule 404(b)." Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, If 18. However, the list of
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noncharacter purposes in the rule "is not exhaustive[.] See State v. Allen, 2005
UT11, f 17,108 P.3d 730, cert, denied, 546 U.S. 832 (Utah 2005), reh'g. denied, 546
U.S. 1082 (2005). Bad acts evidence is admissible undef this first prong so long
as it is relevant to show something other than Defendant's bad character. Id. at
f 24. When prior bad act evidence establishes an eleitient of the crime and is
directly probative of a disputed issue, it may be admipsible even if it tends to
prove that Defendant has committed other crimes. State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4, 5
(Utah 1990); see also State v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192,195 '(Utah 1985), cert, denied,
479 U.S. 813 (1986) (evidence of prior crimes is admissible if the evidence is
relevant to prove a specific element of the crime for Which a Defendant is on
trial; the evidence is not admissible if it is relevant solely to show a Defendant's
propensity to commit a crime).
Second, the bad acts evidence must "mee[t] the requirements of rule 402."
Marcliet, 2009 UT App 262, |^f 29,43; see also Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, f 19
(citing Utah R. Evid. 402). "Under rule 402, all relevant evidence is admissible
except as otherwise provided in the rules." State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ^ 41,
28 P.3d 1278. Relevant evidence is "'evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.'" NelsonWaggoner, 2000 UT 59,119 (quoting Utah R. Evid. 40}).
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Third, prior bad acts evidence must meet "the requirements of rule 403."
Id. at T[20 (citing Utah R. Evid. 403). Rule 403 excludes relevant evidence "if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence/" Utah R.
Evid. 403.
In sum, Defendant must establish that the trial court abused its discretion
in determining that, under the facts of this case, the challenged evidence was
relevant to a proper, noncharacter purpose, and that its probative value was not
substantially outweighed by any potential for unfair prejudice. See Widdison,
2001UT 60, If 41 (citing State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, f f 20-23,993 P.2d 837, cert
den'd 528 U.S. 1164 (2000)).
B, The Evidence is Admissible Under Rule 404(b) to Establish
Defendant's Constructive Possession of the Meth and
Paraphernalia
Probativeness.

The lower court analyzed the prior acts evidence using

the appropriate three-step analysis. First, the court determined that the
evidence was admissible for, among other things, the proper noncharacter
purposes offered by the prosecutor: to "show ownership or possession of the
methamphetamine found in this case, [and] to establish that the items found
with the drugs are in fact drug paraphernalia . . . . " Add. A. at 2; R. 474:6-8.
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Defendant argues that the purposes identified by the trial court are not
valid because the nature of the items as drug paraphernalia was not at issue,
and ownership or possession are not appropriate purposes under rule 404(b).
Br. of Aplt. at 28. Instead, she contends, the evidence serves only to suggest
that, on this occasion, she "acted in conformity" with the prior occasions, "in
direct violation of Rule 404(b)." Id.
By pleading not guilty, "defendant put every element of the charge
against [her] in issue."

State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 927 (UT App. 1994)

(citation omitted) (permitting use of prior bad act evidence that was relevant to
an element of the charged crime), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Doporto,
935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997), reh'g denied, (Mar. 24, 1997). Defendant was not
charged with simply being in the same room with the methamphetamine and
paraphernalia. Rather, she was charged with constructive possession of those
items. That required the State to establish the existence of "a sufficient nexus
between the accused and the drug [and paraphernalia] to permit an inference
that the accused had both the power and the intent td exercise dominion and
control over the drug [and paraphernalia].'" State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, ^f 31,
122 P.3d 639 (quoting State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985)) (bracketed
information added). Defendant acknowledged this burden below, urging the
jury to find that the State had not met it. R. 473:399.
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With Defendant's possession, intent, and use of the meth and
paraphernalia at issue below, the State appropriately looked to Defendant's
prior use of meth to help establish these elements. See Allen, 2005 UT 11, \L7
(the list of noncharacter purposes in rule 404(b) "is not exhaustive[.]"J. See, e.g.,
Workman, 2005 UT 66, f 32 (in a constructive possession case, the required nexus
may be established by means of a number of different factors, including, where
appropriate, "previous drug use"); Teuscher, 883 P.2d at 926-27; State v. Taylor,
818 P.2d 561,570-71 (Utah App. 1991) (Defendant's prior possession of the same
drug packaged in the same manner as the drugs charged at present "was
particularly probative on the issue of constructive possession" and crucial to the
State's case against Defendant), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Doporto, 935
P.2d 484 (Utah Jan. 17,1997), reliearing denied, (Mar 24,1997). Although such
evidence would be inadmissible to establish her propensity to use meth, it was
offered and admitted for the alternative noncharacter purpose of helping to
establish the contested issue of whether she possessed, used, or intended to use
the meth and paraphernalia in this case. See Utah R. Evid. 404(b); State v. Bisner,
2001 UT 99, If 57,37 P.3d 1073; Taylor, 818 P.2d at 570-71. Most of the evidence
established that sometime within the eighteen months preceding the instant
raid, Defendant had admitted to police officers that she had been using meth,
she had tested positive for meth use, and she was convicted of driving while
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under the influence of meth. See Add. A at 1-2. Defendant's 2007 DUI arrest
came within weeks of the raid in this case and generated a toxicology report
demonstrating additional meth use. See Br. Aplt at 25. Together, the evidence
suggests not only that Defendant had a drug habit, but an active meth habit
around the time of the raid in this case, and that her use of the drug was
deliberate or intentional as opposed to mistaken or accidental. Such evidence
suggests that she is likely to have possessed, used or intended to use the items in
the bedroom. Further, it negates any claim that Defendant's prior use of
methamphetamine ended before the instant raid. See Taylor, 818 P.2d at 570, n.8
(noting that evidence was probative where it tended to negate a claim that
someone other than Defendant possessed the drugs). Consequently, the trial
court appropriately determined that the evidence was offered for a proper
noncharacter purpose. See Add. A at 2; Workman, 2005 UT 66, ^ 31-32.
Relevance. Further, the evidence was relevant where the fact of
Defendant's meth use as well as the timing of that use tended to make it more
probable that Defendant possessed, used, or intended to use the charged items.
See Utah R. Crim. P. 401; see Bisner, 2001 UT 99, | 58. The relevance of the
evidence was strengthened by Defendant's 2006 admission that she "smoked
meth whenever she got a chance" because she "couldn't afford to purchase meth
on her own[.]" R. 473:273. Her statement is relevant because it makes it more
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likely that she intended to use the meth and paraphernalia. See Utah R. Crim. P.
401. The evidence also negates any claim that Defendant's meth use ended prior
to the charged incident, again strengthening the State's constructive possession
claim. SeeR. 473:329.
Prejudice versus Probativeness. Finally, prior bad acts evidence must
meet "the requirements of rule 403." Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, f 20;
Marchet, 2009 UT App 262, f f 29,43. Rule 403 excludes relevant evidence "if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Utah R.
Evid. 403. In assessing whether bad acts evidence is admissible under rule 403,
a variety of matters, commonly known as the "S/zzdcZes factors/' must be
considered, including
"[1] the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other
crime, [2] the similarities between the crimes, [3] the interval of
time that has elapsed between the crimes, [4] the need for the
evidence, [5] the efficacy of alternative proof, and [6] the degree to
which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering
hostility."
Marchet, 2009 UT App 262, % 44 (quoting State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96
(Utah 1988)).
However, of the six factors, Defendant points only to three, arguing that
the lack of similarities between the instant case and the prior acts, the interval of
24

time between the acts, and the tendency of the prior bad acts to rouse the jury to
overmastering hostility towards her combine to establish that the evidence
carries a danger of unfair prejudice that substantially outweighs any probative
value it may have. See Br. of Aplt. at 29. To the contrary, a review of the
entirety of the Shickles factors supports the trial court's determination that "the
probative value of the evidence outweighs any unfair prejudicial effect/' Add.
A at 3; R. 474:11-12.
The evidence of the prior acts is exceedingly strong, consisting of a
conviction, an admission, and two toxicology reports.
The prior acts share two similarities with this case: Defendant and her use
of meth. Both are extremely important in light of the State's constructive
possession claim involving meth. The absence of additional similarities does not
necessarily render the prior acts less relevant. See Workman, 2005 UT 66, f ^f 3132.
The interval of time weighs in favor of admission where the evidence of
Defendant's meth use sixteen months prior to the instafit matter and eight short
weeks afterward suggests an on-going meth habit that supports the State's case.
Further, the passage of sixteen months does not dirtninish the relevance of
Defendant's 2006 admission that she "smoked meth whenever she got a chance"
because she "couldn't afford to purchase meth on her own[.]" R. 473:273. The
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circumstances of the meth use in this case present just such an opportunity for
Defendant.
The need for the evidence is great inasmuch as Defendant's meth use is
highly probative of the charged crime and essential to a case built largely on
circumstantial evidence. See State v. Shaffer, 725 P.2d 1301, 1309 (Utah 1986)
(evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is admissible where it is crucial to a
case built primarily on circumstantial evidence); Taylor, 818 P.2d at 570-71.
Nothing in the record or in Defendant's brief suggests that there is any
better or more effective alternative proof regarding the likelihood that she
constructively possessed the meth and paraphernalia.
Finally, it is unlikely that evidence of the prior acts roused the jury to
overmastering hostility toward Defendant.

The prior acts involved no

discernible victim other than Defendant, were not unduly emphasized, and
were not the only evidence pertaining to Defendant's use of drugs—even one of
Defendant's own witnesses discussed Defendant's drug use. See R. 472: 147,
151, 155, 159, 166; R. 473:240, 329. Even the mere fact that Defendant drove
while under the influence of meth, without more, seems highly unlikely to
inspire "overmastering hostility." See Alien, 2005 UT11, f 33. Hence, while the
evidence is admittedly prejudicial to Defendant, it is also highly probative of the
charged offenses.
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Given the lower court's appropriate application of the three-step analysis
and the absence of any likelihood of unfair prejudice, the evidence was
admissible under rule 404(b), and the trial court's ruling does not represent an
abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's
convictions.

y

Respectfully submitted this $0

day of April, 2010.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

ICRIS LEONARD

Assistant Attorhey General
Counsel for Appellee
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

v.

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO EXCLUDE PRIOR BAD ACTS
EVIDENCE

JULLYN DOYLE,

Case No. 071402824

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

Judge Darold J. McDade

This matter comes before the Court on the defendant's Motion in Limine to Exclude Prior
Bad Acts. Having been fully briefed and argued before the Court, the Motion is ripe for decision.
The State put the defendant on notice that it intends to introfjuce the following bad acts
evidence under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 404(b) at trial:
1.

A 2006 DUI conviction wherein the defendant was convicted of driving while
under the influence of methamphetamine.

2.

Statements made by the defendant when she was arrested in 2006 for DUI to the
effect that she had consumed methamphetamine.

?

3.

Toxicology report from the 2006 DUI arrest showing the presence of
methamphetamine in the defendant's blood.

4.

Toxicology report from an August 2007 arrest for DUI, showing the presence of
methamphetamine in the defendant's blood.

The defendant moved to exclude such evidence claiming the evidence is improper under Rule
404(b).
"In deciding whether evidence of other crimes is admissible under rule 404(b), the trial
court must determine (1) whether such evidence is being offered for a proper, non-character
purpose under 404(b), (2) whether such evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, and (3)
whether this evidence meets the requirements of rule 403." State v. Cox, 169 P.3d 806, 813
(Utah Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted).
The Court denies the defendant's motion based upon the following:
The State is not seeking to introduce the evidence of other bad acts to establish character
that conforms with the actions alleged in the current case. Rather, the State is seeking to
introduce such evidence for non-character purposes-i.e., to show ownership or possession of the
methamphetamine found in this case, to establish that the items found with the drugs are in fact
drug paraphernalia (as expressly allowed by statute), and other non-character purposes.
The evidence proposed by the State is clearly relevant under Rule 402 because it tends to
make the existence of a fact of consequence in this matter-the possession or ownership of the
drugs-more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. See URCrP 401.

?

Finally, the probative value of the evidence outweighs any unfair prejudicial effect. The
Court notes that all the evidence the State will submit against the defendant is prejudicial, but
Rule 403 only excludes "unfair prejudice." The Court finds that the evidence is not unfairly
prejudicial and is therefore proper.
Therefore, the Court DENIES the defendant's motion to exclude the prior bad acts
mentioned in this order and the State may introduce the same at trial.
Dated this day:

} - i v ;.."* P's
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pled down from a first-degree.

I was able to see that last

2

night, and see what was there, what charges were there.

3

Ludicrous to assert that I'm trying to —

4

to assert that I'm trying to give you false information by

5

only giving you one plea agreement.

6

they've given, what does it say?

7

Count I.

8

"I will plead to Count III."

9

dismissed.

It's amended.

or seem

This plea agreement that

The State agrees to amend

Obviously it's a lesser charge.
The remaining counts will be

"The State agrees to recommend that we proceed

10

with sentencing today."

11

then.

"I agree to testify against Jullyn Doyle," May 5th, same

12

date.

Testimony changed.

13

State allowed her to be sentenced

It can't be any clearer. Whether or not she understood

14

it, I'm ready to call Ms. Jarvis, and I request to call her.

15

The jury clearly heard, though, clearly heard from Ms. Cuenca,

16

"I'm here of my own free will and choice.

17

citizen and I'm telling you that Jullyn Doyle smoked meth,"

18

change of testimony.

19

this."

20

I'm just a good

"No State didn't give me a deal for

These documents prove otherwise.

They prove otherwise

21

that she was given a deal in exchange to testify against Jullyn

22

Doyle.

23

Ms. Jarvis to the stand to testify.

2425

How much clearer can it be?

Request to be able to call

THE COURT: You can call Ms. Jarvis when the jury comes
back in.

That's your case, not before me.

If you want to
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impeach Ms. Cuenca, you need to do that in front of the jury

2

MR. DODD: I

3

THE COURT: —

4

MR. DODD: -- certainly request that, your Honor, but

—

—
not before the Court.

5

the State is alleging that somehow Cuenca didn't think she was

6

getting a deal.

7

testify of what she does

I'd like to call Ms. Jaryis to be able to
—

8

THE COURT: You can do --

9

MR. DODD: —

10

THE COURT: —

with every one of her clients.
that before the jury.

You're asking me

11

to make a finding of fact in a case that the jury hasn't heard

12

your side.

13

MR. DODD: No, your Honor.

14

THE COURT: As far as the argument you're making

15

MR. DODD: I'm asking you

16

THE COURT: —

17

—

—

if you want to impeach Ms. Cuenca, you

need to do it in front of the jury.

18

MR. DODD: I'm not asking to impeach Ms. Cuenca.

19

I'm asking to present evidence to this Court that there was

20

perjury.

21

THE COURT: I don't find misconduct on the part of the

22

State, number one.

Whether or not she committed perjury is an

23

issue for the jury to hear.

24

my finding.

25

as well as the State, to pick up discovery.

You made your arguments.

That's

As far as discovery goes, you have that ability,
That's the bottom
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line.

2

Your motion, I read through it carefully.

3

case.

4

case hadn't been tried.

5

this motion in the middle of the case.

6

Ms. Cuenca, do it in front of the jury.

7

fact.

8
9

The case involved a post conviction motion.
This is different.

I read the
The whole

You're bringing in

If you want to impeach
They're the finders of

MR. DODD: Your Honor, in the alternative I'll move for
a mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct.

10

THE COURT: Denied.

11

MR. DODD: Thank you.

12

THE COURT: You motion to dismiss is also denied.

13

MR. DODD: Thank you.

14

THE COURT: Do we need to take a break, or do we need

15

to —

how many -- can you present your next witness, Mr. Dodd,

16

within the next 40 minutes?

17

take a lunch break, or do you need —

18

lunch now and come back?

Can we get that done before we
should we just take a

19

MR. DODD: I think we should take a lunch break now.

20

THE COURT: Okay.

21

MR. PETERS: I would request the same.

22

THE COURT: All right.

23

then, for lunch.

24

for everybody?

25

We'll go ahead and recess,

Let's return at —

MR. DODD: Yes.

is 1 o'clock enough time
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW & ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
JULLYN DOYLE,

Case No. 071402824
JUDGE Darold J. McDade

Defendant.

This case is before the Court on the defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment. Aaron Dodd
represented the defendant and Timothy Taylor represented the State of Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. On September 24 and 25, 2008? a jury trial was held wherein the defendant was
convicted of Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, and Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor.
2. On or about November 17, 2008, prior to the imposition of a sentence, the defendant
filed a Motion to Arrest Judgment. The defendant invoked two separate arguments in favor of his
Motion to Arrest Judgment: 1) That the State of Utah failed to provide exculpatory evidence after
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the defendant had filed a Specific Request for Discovery inquiring into any plea deals with the
co-defendant in the case, and; 2) that the State of Utah suborned perjury by failing to correct
alleged false testimony by a co-defendant.
3. On or about December 10, 2008, the State of Utah filed a Memorandum in Opposition
to Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment.
4. On or about December 19, 2008, the defendant filed a Reply to State's Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment.
5. On or about December 29, 2008, the State filed a Supplemental Memorandum in
Response to Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment.
6. On January 12, 2009, the court received oral arguments from the parties.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
After reviewing the aforementioned documents and receiving arguments from the parties,
the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
1. The Court finds that on or about November 15, 2007, the defendant filed a Specific
Request for Discovery asking the State to provide a copy of any agreements between the State
and the co-defendants in exchange for testifying against the defendant. At this point in the
proceedings, the State responded indicating, "To date, no offers have been made to any codefendants in exchange for testifying against this defendant."
2. On or about May 5, 2008, Shantel Cuenca "Cuenca", a co-defendant in the present
case, pled guilty in two unrelated cases. In case 081401078, Cuenca plead guilty to Distribution
2
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of a Controlled Substance with Prior Convictions, a first degree felony and False Information to a
Peace Officer, a class C misdemeanor. In case number 081401181, Cuenca pled guilty to
Possession of a Controlled Substance in Drug Free Zone, a second degree felony. As part of this
plea deal, Cuenca agreed to "testify against Jullyn Doyle and Jorge Navarrette-Lopez." Cuenca
waived time for sentencing and was sentenced to the Utah State Prison with the aforementioned
cases running concurrently with each other.
3. On or about September 12, 2008, the State filed a Supplemental Response to
Defendant's Specific Request for Discovery as it related to any possible plea deal with the codefendant. In part, the State indicated, "The State objects to this request due to the fact that the
items requested are not discoverable." The defendant did not object; to the State's response
neither did it seek the State to compel with its discovery request.
4. The Court finds that upon receiving the State's objection to provide discovery, the
defendant could have objected or filed a Motion to Compel in order to discover the details of any
possible plea deal between Cuenca and the State. Therefore, the defendant was put on notice by
the State of a possible plea deal with Cuenca but the defendant failed to further address this issue
before the trial began. However, the Co art also finds that any failure by the State to provide
information regarding a plea deal with the co-defendant was cured when defense counsel
thoroughly explored the details of Cuenca's plea deal during the trial by examining both Cuenca
and the Cuenca's legal counsel in front of the jury.
5. This Court specifically finds support for its decision in the case of State v. Bisner, 37
P.3d 1073, (Utah 2001). In this case the Utah Supreme Court stated:
3
O0U4b t

Despite the strictures imposed on prosecutors by this constitutional
duty of disclosure, the United States Supreme Court has held that it is
in the specific instance where there is discovery after trial, of
information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to
the defense that reversal of a conviction for nondisclosure is required.
Accordingly, courts universally refuse to overturn convictions where
the evidence at issue is known to the defense prior to or during trial,
where the defendant reasonably should have known of the evidence,
or where the defense had the opportunity to use the evidence to its
advantage during the trial but failed to do so.
Id. at 1082-83. (emphasis in original).
Since the defendant learned of a possible plea deal before trial but also thoroughly
examined the details of the plea deal during the trial, this Court finds the State of Utah did not
fail to provide the defendant with exculpatory evidence and the defendant's due process rights
wrere not violated.
6. The Court finds that the case of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), is
distinguishable to the case at hand due to the fact that the defendant in Napue did not discover
exculpatory evidence known by the prosecutor until after the case was completed. Therefore, the
Court finds that Napue is not controlling based on the facts in the present case.
7. The Court also finds that the State did not suborn perjury. "Perjury" is a "false material
statement under oath or affirmation or swears or affirms the truth of a material statement
previously made and he does not believe the statement to be true." Utah Code Ann. §76-8-502.
8. Shantel Cuenca was charged with a first degree felony and ultimately ended up
pleading to a first degree felony. The difference between the original charge and her plea was the
dismissal of a drug free zone which removed the penalty from a mandatory 5 years to life to a
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penalty of not less than 5 years to life. The Court finds that when Cuenca indicated she did not
receive a plea deal in exchange for her testimony, she may have believed she actually did not
receive a plea deal since she was still sentenced 5 years to life at the Utah State Prison. Since
Cuenca may have believed she did not receive a plea deal, the Court cannot conclude that the
State suborned perjury.
ORDER
Based on the aforementioned findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Court finds
there is not a good cause to arrest judgment pursuant to Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment is hereby DENIED.

Aaron P. Dodd
Attorney for Defendant
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